Bad Opsec Considered Harmful (buttondown.com)

A new GitHub repository has emerged, cataloging “Bad OPSEC” cases, illustrating how individuals have been identified due to operational security failures. The creator argues that learning from these failures is ineffective without understanding the underlying principles of OPSEC. He emphasizes that relying solely on failed examples can provide a biased perspective, as successful operators who maintained good OPSEC are not represented. He critiques this approach for lacking a structured framework that contextualizes these failures, which is essential for developing a deeper understanding of operational security. The article underscores key OPSEC principles: cover, concealment, and compartmentation, by analyzing specific cases, such as a Harvard student's bomb threat. This case exemplifies how insufficient layered defenses lead to compromise. The student’s reliance on technological solutions without sufficient backup measures resulted in a complete failure of concealment and compartmentation. In contrast, another case involving a Doxbin operator highlights the importance of financial compartmentation, demonstrating that robust multilayer strategies can withstand failures in individual security measures. Overall, the significance of this critique lies in the call for a more nuanced educational approach that balances case studies with an understanding of security principles, ultimately enhancing the learning process in the AI/ML community and beyond.