From Aristotle to John Searle and Back Again: Metaphysics and Computation (2016) (www.academia.edu)

This paper revisits the debate over whether computation is an intrinsic feature of natural systems by reframing contemporary computational descriptions in terms of Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics. It argues that John Searle’s complaint—most famously exemplified by the Chinese Room—that computation is observer-relative and therefore not a genuine property of physical processes is compelling only under a modern mechanical philosophy that rejects teleology. By restoring Aristotelian notions of formal and final causality (substantial vs. accidental forms and immanent purposiveness), the author contends that many computational accounts map naturally onto intrinsic organizational and goal-directed features of systems, rather than being mere ascriptions imposed by observers. For the AI/ML community this matters because it reframes foundational questions about what it means to model cognition and biological information processing: if computation can be grounded in intrinsic formal causes and immanent teleology, then computational explanations of living systems and intelligent behavior gain metaphysical heft beyond instrumental descriptions. Key technical implications include a clearer distinction between organismic computation (tied to inherent developmental ends) and engineered computation (accidental, observer-assigned), a challenge to purely mechanistic readings of neural and cognitive models, and potential consequences for how we interpret emergent behavior, grounding of semantics, and normative claims about AI systems.